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Abstract 
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1. Introduction  
Financial crisis raises the recent intense debate on the association between 
accounting changes and financial crisis. For instance, the accusation of market value 
accounting after the 2007-2009 financial crisis, along with the economic significance of 
banks’ liquidity and capital provision requirements, reveals the vital economic role of bank 
accounting (Beatty and Liao, 2014). Bank earnings persistence plays an important role in 
maintaining the stability of the whole financial system and so has attracted growing debate 
on the factors that drive such a phenomenon (Cumming et al., 2012; Beaver et al., 2012; 
Gao and Zhang, 2015; Peterson et al., 2015; Hui et al, 2016; Buchner et al., 2016).  
According to economic competition theory, competition contributes to the mean 
reversion of market profitability (decreased earnings persistence) in the long term (Stigler, 
1961; Mueller, 1977, 1986; Berger et al., 2000; Goddard et al., 2011). In other words, 
competition could erode away all excessive returns by attracting new entrants or all 
excessive losses by forcing the improvement of operations or exit of the market. Thus, 
competition could directly reduce earnings persistence. However, accounting studies 
implicitly suggest that earnings persistence is a result of earnings management (Sloan, 
1993; Pope and Wang, 2005; Chen, 2010; Dechow et al., 2010; Skinner and Soltes, 2011; 
Li, 2010; Healy et al., 2015).  
Few studies have attempted to reconcile the differences between theories that 
explain the main driving force of bank earnings persistence. It is possible that, as an 
effective external governance mechanism, competition could reduce earnings management 
via increasing the cost of mispricing (Graham et al., 2005; Dechow et al., 2010; Burks et 
al., 2016; Jiang et al., 2016). Hence, the resulted reduced earnings persistence is the result 
of decreased earnings management caused by the increased competition. It is thus the 
central focus of this paper to determine whether the impact of competition on bank 
earnings persistence is directly or indirectly from earnings management.  
We use a comprehensive data set of the US banking industry for the period between 
1986 and 2013 and our final sample includes 15,546 unique commercial banks with 
226,153 firm-year observations. The benefits of studying the banking industry are two-
fold: First, our focus on a single homogenous industry removes the challenges of defining 
the market where a firm competes, thereby removing the potential bias in industry 
identification that is overly broadly or unduly narrowly defined. Second, the focus of 
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analyzing the banking sector eliminates the concern on conglomerates that operate in 
different industries and thus face competitions in different markets.  
We use a partial adjustment model to capture bank earnings adjustment speed, which 
allows earnings targets to be bank-specific and to vary over time (see, also, Healy et al., 
2014; Flannery and Rangan, 2006; De Jonghe and Öztekin., 2015). Earnings adjustment 
speed refers to the speed at which banks adjust earnings to their target ROA, and equals 
one minus earnings persistence. Thus, faster adjustment speeds indicate lower earnings 
persistence. We estimate heterogeneous adjustment speeds via a two-stage procedure. In 
the first stage, we obtain a constant adjustment speed λ for each bank and estimate the 
target ROA for each bank-year. In the second stage, we use the gap between the target 
ROA and the observed realized ROA to obtain a time-varying adjustment speed for each 
bank in each year.  
We exploit the cross-state, time-varying variation in the removal of interstate bank 
branching prohibitions to identify an exogenous increase in bank competition. The 
introduction of the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) in 1994 by 
the US authorities relaxed geographical restrictions to bank expansion across state borders. 
This relaxation enhances competition by enabling banks to enter into new markets in other 
states, thereby allowing them to compete with those banks in the local market (DeYoung, 
2010; Rice and Strahan, 2010, among others). 
We start by investigating whether banks adjust their earnings with a faster speed in 
those states that implement the IBBEA and deregulate interstate banking within their 
borders to a great extent. We find that an increase in the Geographic Expansion Index, 
which indicates an increase in bank competition, leads to an increase in bank earnings 
adjustment speed. This finding is in line with the prediction of the economic theory that 
competition reduces earnings persistence (Stigler, 1961). We also find that banks with 
higher earnings management, which is measured as Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions, 
tend to have slower earnings adjustment speed. This finding is in line with the arguments 
in the extant accounting literature. 
Our findings hold after controlling for state and time fixed effects, a wide array of 
time-varying bank characteristics, such as size, risk, capital-asset ratio, efficiency, and 
macroeconomic conditions, such as GDP growth, inflation and GDP per capita in each 
state. We conduct a host of robustness tests to ensure that our findings are not driven by 
potential biases in the sample or alternative explanations. In our additional cross-sectional 
analysis, we find that the impact of bank competition on earnings adjustment speed is 
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reduced with the increase of banks’ abilities to sustain earnings, including size, 
diversification, managerial efficiency and safety. 
Next, we investigate whether the positive impact of competition on bank earnings 
adjustment speed goes through an indirect earnings management channel. If this were true, 
we should expect to find a negative impact of competition on bank earnings management, 
because a higher level of competition would result in lower earnings management, which 
will then lead to higher earnings adjustment speed. The extant literature, however, does not 
provide a widely accepted direction on the relationship between firm competition and 
earnings management. The researchers who advocate a negative relationship argue that 
competition acts as an external governance mechanism, which prevents managerial slack 
and protects the interest of shareholders (Dechow et al., 2010), and that competition 
increases the cost of misreporting, thereby curbing earnings management incentives 
(Graham et al., 2005).  
On the other hand, if the positive impact of competition on bank earnings adjustment 
speed does not go through the earnings management channel, we expect to find a non-
negative (positive or insignificant) impact of competition on bank earnings management. 
This will then be consistent with another strand of the literature which argues that 
increased competition puts higher pressure on managers and hence, induces managers’ 
unethical behaviors such as earnings management, giving rise to an empirically observed 
positive relation between competition and earnings management (Shleifer, 2004; 
Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Bagnoli and Watts, 2010; 
Tomy, 2016; Dou et al., 2016).  
To answer this question, we conduct two analyses to examine whether competition 
exerts a positive impact on bank earnings management by using two bank earnings 
management frameworks. First, we use discretionary loan loss provisions, which is widely 
used to measure earnings management in the banking industry (see, e.g., Beatty et al., 
2002; Cohen et al., 2014; Cornett et al., 2009; Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Beatty and Liao, 
2014). We indeed find a positive relation between competition and discretionary loan loss 
provisions. Thus, our evidence does not support the argument that the impact of 
competition on bank earnings adjustment speed goes indirectly through the channel of 
earnings management.  
Second, we consider the possibility that banks may use securities available for sale to 
smooth earnings, as suggested by the recent findings of Barth et al. (2015), and Dong and 
Zhang (2015). Available for Sale (AFS) securities is the largest category of banks’ 
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securities that comprise a sizable proportion of bank assets (Nissim and Penman, 2007; 
Laux and Leuz, 2010). It is less costly to conduct earnings management via realizing gains 
and losses on AFS securities than via managing accruals or by involving in real activities 
because sales of securities are not subject to ex post scrutiny by professional institutions 
such as auditors. This advantage may therefore enables banks to continuously manage 
earnings despite facing competition. If this is true, regardless of whether competition is 
strong or weak, banks can manage AFS to achieve the purpose of earnings management 
via. Our evidence supports this argument, and again suggests that competition directly 
impacts bank earnings persistence, rather than indirectly going through the channel of 
earnings management. 
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, to our best knowledge, 
we are the first to document the causal relation between competition and earnings 
persistence by employing Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act as an 
exogenous shock. Prior studies tend to ignore the endogeneity with respect to the causal 
relation between competition and earnings persistence (Goddard et al., 2004; Gropp and 
Kashyap, 2010; Goddard et al., 2011). Recently, Healy et al. (2014) recognize that it is 
difficult to attribute causality between competition and earnings persistence, given many 
channels that drive competitive forces, such as government regulation. Our study fills this 
gap by employing a government regulation change as an exogenous shock that impacts 
bank competition.   
Second, we examine whether the competition law affects banks with different size, 
level of diversification, management efficiency, and level of default risk. We find that the 
stronger a bank is in its ability to sustain earnings, as reflected by having a large size, 
better diversification, higher managerial efficiency and lower default risk, the lower is the 
impact of competition on bank earnings adjustment speed. Third, we provide evidence that 
the effect of competition on bank earnings persistence is direct, but not indirectly through 
the channel of earnings management.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents conceptual 
framework. In Section 3, we describe our identification strategy, sample construction, 
instruments, models and summary statistics. Section 4 presents and discusses our main 
results and Section 5 conducts two additional analyses. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Conceptual framework 
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Economic scholars argue that competition directly impacts earnings persistence, 
where competition could erode away all economic excessive returns and losses in the long 
run and thus, the market profitability level will converge toward a long-term equilibrium 
(Stigler, 1961; Mueller, 1977, 1986; Berger et al., 2000; Goddard et al., 2011). More 
specifically, the excessive profit currently possessed by a firm attracts new competitors to 
enter the market by offering similar or same product with lower prices, leading to 
decreases in the profit margin. This process will not stop until firms’ profitability reaches 
the average profit rate of the market. For firms with the profits under the market average 
will receive precaution from investors to reach the market average level in a short time. 
Otherwise, investors will withdraw their investment, resulting in the exit of the 
underperforming firms from the market. Thus, competition directly reduces earnings 
persistence.   
On the other hand, there is a widely accepted consensus that earnings persistence is 
a result of earnings management choice or earnings manipulation (Sloan, 1993; Pope and 
Wang, 2005; Chen, 2010; Dechow et al., 2010; Skinner and Soltes, 2011). The 
underpinning rationale is that, with information asymmetry between managers and 
investors, firms smooth earnings for purposes like taxes minimization, dividend payouts, 
target achievements, hiding poor economic performance or avoidance of covenants (Guay 
et al., 1996; Arya et al., 1998; Burgstahler et al., 2006). Managers are also motivated to 
smooth reported earnings overtime to obtain relatively constant compensation (Gaver et 
al., 1995; Holthausen et al., 1995; Healy, 1985; Warfield et al., 1995; Bergstresser and 
Philippon, 2006). For instance, managers might manipulate earnings downward when 
bonuses have already reached maximum levels, and might manipulate earnings upward 
when the actual earnings are not qualified for a bonus plan. Subjecting to regulatory capital 
requirements, banks with lower regulatory capital are motivated to increase it. 
Consequently, banks might manipulate earnings to accomplish that objective (Barth et al., 
2015).  
 
3. Data and variables 
3.1. Data 
To explore the impact of competition and earnings management on earnings 
persistence, we combine data from several sources. From Federal Reserve Report of 
Condition and Income (Call Reports), we obtain the data of balance sheets and income 
7 
 
statements at the commercial bank level, rather than their bank holding company levels. 
We exclude from our sample foreign banks and banks with total assets less than one 
million US dollars. Macroeconomic information is from World Bank database. Finally, our 
full sample includes 15,546 banks with a total of 226,153 firm-year observations from 51 
states over the period of 1986-2013.  
 
3.2. The identification strategy of bank competition 
Prior studies use different measures, such as country survey index, the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index, and the Lerner Index, to measure competition at the country, industry, 
firm or product level (Healy et al., 2014; Goddard et al., 2004; Goddard et al., 2011; 
Berger et al., 2000). These measures, however, cannot address the endogeneity issues 
between competition and earnings persistence because unobservable cross-sectional 
heterogeneity could impact both competition and earnings persistence. On the other hand, 
reverse causality may also exist. For example, persistent earnings of the industry may 
indicate better business operations, continuous profits, increasing stock prices and lower 
debt costs (Lin et al., 2013) and hence, can attract new competitor entrants. Alternatively, 
persistent earnings of the firm may increase the capability of existing firms in preventing 
new entrants into the market, resulting in less competition.   
We use Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA), which relaxes 
geographical restrictions on bank expansion crossing state borders enacted by the US 
authorities in 1994, as an exogenous shock to document the causality between competition 
and earnings persistence. Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) was 
passed in 1994 and completed in 1997. It allows bank holding companies to acquire banks 
across states (effective in 1995) and to expand across states (effective in 1997) (Rice and 
Strahan, 2010). Regarded as the watershed event, IBBEA indicates the end of an era of 
geographic restrictions on bank expansion which could be traced back to the 19th century 
(Rice and Strahan, 2010).  
The passage of IBBEA mainly involves the relaxation of four restrictions: (1) Age 
restriction: State could impose a minimum existence year for banks that seek to enter. 
Many states set their age requirement at 5 years, while several states set a lower age 
requirement (eg.3 years) or no minimum age limit at all. (2) De novo interstate branching 
restriction: states could disallow de novo interstate bank branching, under which situation, 
all out-of-state banks could only open one branch in the focal state. This makes entry into 
certain out-of-state markets particularly difficult, because the potential of fast expansion of 
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an out-of-state bank is significantly constrained. (3) Individual branching acquisition 
restriction: in an interstate merger transaction, states could require an out-of-state bank 
(Bidder) to acquire all branches of an in-state bank (Asker). Like de novo branching, 
permitting acquisition of individual branches lowers the cost of entry for interstate banks. 
(4) Statewide cap on deposits restriction: states could restrict the maximum fraction of 
deposits that an out-of-state bank could hold. Officially, a cap of 30% is suggested by 
IBBEA, but each state maintains the discretion to change it. States could set a deposit cap 
to prevent a large in-state bank from entering into an interstate merger. For example, if a 
state sets a deposit cap of 20%, a bank in that state with more than 20% statewide deposits 
fraction could not be acquired.    
This Act allows states to erect barriers to branch expansion. However, some states 
make use of this provision by prohibiting out-of-state banks from opening or acquiring 
branches, by requiring the minimum age of bank branches that could be acquired, or by 
mandating the maximum amount of deposits that banks could hold. Therefore, IBBEA 
increases banks’ competition in each state while the magnitude of increased competition in 
each estate is different. Following Rice and Strahan (2010), we create a variable called: 
‘Geographic Expansion Index’, which decreases with the extent of interstate branching 
deregulation restrictions in a state. Hence, an increase in the Geographic Expansion Index 
indicates an increase in bank competition.  
It is important to note that interstate bank deregulation is exogenous to bank earnings 
persistence. There is no empirical evidence to show that banks’ earnings persistence affects 
the timing of deregulation. Thus, the interstate bank deregulation Act tends to be a 
disordered act that provides a valuable research laboratory for assessing the influence of 
competition on banks’ earnings persistence. There are also extensive studies applying 
IBBEA as an exogenous shock to bank competition on topics of firm financing (Rice and 
Strahan, 2010), firm innovation (Cornaggia et al., 2015; Amore et al., 2013), bank liquidity 
(Shenoy and Williams, 2015) and market valuation of bank holding companies (Goetz et 
al., 2013), among others.  
 
3.3. Earnings management measure: Discretionary loan loss provision model 
Discretionary loan loss provision becomes the most common vehicle to manipulate 
bank earnings after the launch of Statements of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133 
(short for SFAS 133), which requires firms to measure total assets and liabilities at fair 
value on the balance sheet (Liu and Ryan, 2006). We hence follow Beatty and Liao (2014), 
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Cohen et al. (2014), Cornett et al. (2009) and Cheng and Warfield (2005) to use the 
discretionary loan loss provision (DLLP) model to measure bank earnings management. 
The absolute value of the residual from estimating equation (1) as shown below represents 
the degree of each bank’s earnings management. The error term represents the unexplained 
component of the regression and hence, is treated as the Discretionary Loan Loss 
Provisions (DLLP). 
Loan Loss Provisionit = 𝛽𝛽1Sizeit + 𝛽𝛽2 ΔLoan Charge-offsit 
                                           + 𝛽𝛽3ΔLoansit  + 𝛽𝛽4ΔNon-performing Loansit                                               + 𝛽𝛽5ΔNon-performing Loansit-1  
                                       + 𝛽𝛽6ΔNon-performing Loansit+1 + ε𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (1)               
where Sizeit is the natural logarithm of total assets, ΔLoan Charge-offsit represents the 
difference in total loan charge-offs between periods t and t-1, ΔLoansit represents the 
difference in total loans between periods t and t-1, ΔNon-performing Loansit reflects the 
change in non-performing loans between periods t and t-1, ΔNon-performing Loansit-1 
reflects the change in non-performing loans between periods t-1 and t-2, and ΔNon-
performing Loansit+1 represents the change in non-performing loans between periods t+1 
and t. All the variables except Size in Equation (1) are deflated by the book value of total 
assets of each bank.  
 
3.4. Earnings adjustment speed: The partial adjustment model 
A number of studies use a first-order autoregressive model to capture the dynamics 
of firm’s earnings (Mueller, 1990; Jenny and Weber, 1990). This model can only produce a 
time-invariant persistence level for each entity. However, the persistence level of each 
entity in every year may not remain unchanged. In order to improve the estimation 
accuracy, several studies adopt partial adjustment model to obtain time-varying persistence 
level for each entity (Healey et al., 2014; Gropp and Heider, 2010; Memmel and Raupach, 
2010; De Jonghe and Öztehin, 2015). We follow these studies and employ the partial 
adjustment model to estimate the dynamic persistence level for each bank in each year. 
In the partial adjustment model, the bank’s current return level (ROA) is a weighted 
average of its target and its previous year’s ROA: 
ROAit - ROAit-1  = λi(ROA*it - ROAit-1) + εit,                                     (2) 
where ROAit is the return on total assets of bank i in year t. ROA*it is the target ROA of 
bank i in year t. λi represents the proportional adjustment for bank i. In our context, λi 
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captures the exw a bank operates away from its target ROA. Alternatively, ROA is 
predicted to mean revert to a target level, ROA*. Therefore, bank earnings adjustment 
speed refers to the speed at which banks’ earnings adjust to their target ROA and equals 1 
minus earnings persistence. The ROA* can be determined by a cross-sectional model: 
ROA*it = βi Xit + εit,                                                                           (3) 
where Xit is a vector of the bank and macroeconomic characteristics influencing ROA. 
Substituting Equation (3) into Equation (2) and rearranging yields Equation (4) below: 
ROAit =λi𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖Xit-1 + (1- λi) ROAit-1+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,                                              (4)         
 Equation (4) shows that in the partial adjustment model, the bank’s current ROA is 
a weighted average (with λi between 0 and 1) of ROA in its previous period, the 
unobserved fixed effects and random shocks. If the value of λi is small, the adjustment 
speed is slow, suggesting that it takes a long time for a bank to reach its target ROA after a 
shock to its ROA. On the other hand, known as an inertial fact in the partial adjustment 
model, (1- λi) represents the earnings persistence level. The smaller value of adjustment 
speed indicates a higher level of earnings persistence. When (1 - λi) equals 1, the 
adjustment speed equals 0, indicating that the earnings level is unchanged. In contrast, 
when (1 - λi) equals 0, the adjustment speed equals 1, suggesting that there is no earnings 
persistence because the speed of adjustment to the target ROA is instant. 
In the partial adjustment model, the target ROA (ROA*) is unobservable and is not 
necessarily constant over periods. Therefore, we employ the cross-sectional model 
proposed by Fama and French (2006) to estimate the target ROA0F1.  
ROA*it = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1Income Diversificationit + 𝛽𝛽2Non-Performing Loansit  
                + 𝛽𝛽3Revenueit + 𝛽𝛽4Capital Ratioit + 𝛽𝛽5Sizeit  
                        + 𝛽𝛽6Management Efficiencyit   + 𝛽𝛽7Loansit + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖          (5) 
where Income Diversification is the non-interest income to total revenue ratio, the variable 
of Non-performing Loans is the non-performing loans to total asset ratio, Revenue is total 
revenue to total asset ratio and the Capital Ratio is total equity to total assets ratio, Size is 
the natural logarithm of total assets. Management Efficiency is calculated via total costs 
divided by total revenues, and Loans is the total net loans over total assets. We employee 
Fama-Macbeth estimation in this first stage estimation (see, also, Fama and French, 2006; 
Healy et al, 2014).  
 
1 The variables used in equation (5) are different from those used in Fama and French (2006) because 
our focus is on the banking industry that they do not analyze.  
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The above model for estimating the target ROA uses contemporaneous variables, 
for which Healy et al. (2014) demonstrate to be sufficient to predict the target ROA. The 
adjustments are meaningful if there is a difference between the target ROA and the actual 
ROA. The GAP is applied to define the difference between these two variables: 
GAPit = ROA*it - ROAit                                                               (6) 
To test what determines the dynamic of bank earnings adjustment speed. We modify 
the empirical setup described in Equation (2) and adjust the model such that the adjustment 
speed, λ, can vary over time and banks: 
λit= λi+𝛾𝛾Zit-1                                                                               (7) 
We assume that λit is dynamic and varies across banks and over time. 𝛾𝛾 is a vector of 
coefficients for the adjustment speed function and Zit-1 is a vector of the bank and 
macroeconomic characteristics that could affect adjustment speed. Substituting Equation 
(7) into Equation (2) yields the specification for a partial adjustment model with dynamic 
adjustment speed λit, that is heterogeneous:  
ROAit - ROAit-1 = (λi + 𝛾𝛾Zit-1) GAPit-1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                (8) 
We follow Healy et al, (2014) and Flannery and Rangan (2006) to estimate 
Equation (8) in two steps. In the first step, we use Fama-Macbeth regression for Equation 
(4) and obtain an estimate of target ROA (i.e., ROAit*) (see, also, Fama and French, 2006; 
Healy et al, 2014). Then, we use Equation (6) to calculate the earnings GAP for each bank 
in each year. In the second stage analysis, we follow De Jonghe and Öztekin (2015) and 
use OLS with bank and year fixed effects. Heterogeneity robust standard errors are 
clustered at bank level (for robustness, we also conducted several alternative clustering 
methods and our conclusions are not changed). Having running regression as in Equation 
(8), we obtain a set of coefficients 𝛾𝛾. These coefficients allow us to directly test how 
bank’s competition and earnings management influence earnings adjustment speed. The 
sign of 𝛾𝛾 reflects the relationship between Z and the adjustment speed.  
 
3.5. Summary statistics  
Table 1 displays the summary statistics of variables. Appendix I shows the 
definitions of the variables. We winsorize all variables except Size at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles to mitigate the influence of outliers. Panel B of Table 1 shows that the mean 
value of target ROA is 1.048% and the mean value of realized ROA is 0.974%, resulting in 
a positive GAP of 0.09%. These figures are consistent with studies that use Call Reports 
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database (Beatty et al., 2002; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013). Geographic Expansion Index 
ranges from zero to four and the mean value of this index is 2.06, indicating that the US 
states overall apply IBBEA but create on average two barriers for interstate branching. The 
absolute mean value of Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions (i.e., earnings management) is 
0.44, which accounts for 0.278% of total assets (= 0.44 multiplied by the mean value of 
Loan to asset). The mean value of realized gains and losses of AFS is 0.004. 
The average Z-score of US banks is around 24. On average, US banks lend 63% of 
their assets as loans and hold 9.8% equity to assets ratio. The average total assets of US 
banks is 705 million dollars. The average asset growth is equal to 8.7%. The average value 
of one minus costs to income ratio, a proxy for banks’ managerial efficiency, is equal to 
20.8%. The US banks, on average, generate around 10% of total revenue from non-interest 
income. Both the GDP growth and Inflation range from 2% to 3%.  
Panel B of Table 1 shows that discretionary loan loss provisions have a slight 
increase after the introduction of IBBEA. Z-score increases from 24 to 25, on average. The 
mean of capital ratio increases from 9.3% to 10.2%, showing that banks in general reserve 
more equity after deregulation. Commercial banks increase size considerably from a mean 
of 361 million to 875 million. Banks, on average grow lending and diversification and 
improve cost-efficiency after the introduction of IBBEA.      
<Insert Table 1 here> 
 
Table 2 reports the correlations between the variables used in this study. Geographic 
Expansion Index and Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions are positively correlated, 
showing that banks that operate in those states with lower regulatory restrictions use more 
earnings management. Most of the correlations are modest and the multicollinearity 
problem is limited.  
<Insert Table 2 here> 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1. The impact of Interstate banking deregulation on earnings adjustment speed  
Table 3 presents the regression results of Equation (4) for the first stage Fama-
MecBeth (1973) estimation. Most of the lagged variables that explain the target ROA have 
significant coefficients with expected signs, except for the insignificant coefficient on 
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Capital ratiot-1. The coefficient estimate on the lagged ROA indicates that the constant 
adjustment speed of earnings persistence in the first-stage specification is 0.488 per year (= 
1- 0.512).   
<Insert Table 3 here> 
Table 4 reports the regression results for the second-stage estimation of Equation (8). 
We consider a ten-year window of the introduction of IBBEA which lasts for three years 
from 1994 to 1997. Specifically, we use 5 years before and after the introduction of 
IBBEA Act for each state to examine the effect of IBBEA. Because different states adopt 
the regulation changes in different years, therefore our ten-year window vary across 
different states. For example, Ohio State instantly relieved all four restrictions on the 21th 
May 1997, therefore the data for Ohio spans a ten-year window from 1992 to 2002. On the 
other hand, Washington State firstly relieved state deposit cap restriction on the 6th June 
1996 and then gradually relieved other restrictions in following years. Since we consider a 
ten-year window around the first introduction of IBBEA, the data for Washington hence 
spans from 1991 to 2001. Thus, the overall time period for all states spans from 1989 to 
2002. This allows us to capture the effect of dramatic changes of deregulation across states 
and time.  
We standardize all the explanatory variables in the regression, except for Geographic 
Expansion Index because this index is an ordinal variable rather than a continuous variable. 
The coefficient of Geographic Expansion Index is positive and significant. Since a higher 
Geographic Expansion Index value indicates higher competition, a positive regression 
coefficient of Geographic Expansion Index indicates that banks in more competitive 
markets tend to adjust their earnings at a higher speed. As shown in Column (1) of Table 4, 
a one inter-quartile increase of Geographic Expansion Index leads to an increase of 
earnings adjustment speed by 9.4%. This result is in accordance with economic 
competition theory that competition impacts earnings persistence by eroding away 
economic excessive returns and losses in the long run (Stigler, 1961).  
In Column (2) of Table 4, the coefficient of Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions is 
negative and significant, suggesting that banks with higher earnings management tend to 
have a slow earnings adjustment speed. Earnings adjustment speed will decrease by 4.8% 
(0.178*0.27) if Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions rises by one standard deviation. This 
result also supports the widely documented opinion that the principle purpose of earnings 
management is to smooth earnings (Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Dechow et al., 2010; Gaver 
et al., 1995; Holthausen et al., 1995). In addition, we find that the coefficients of Capital 
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Ratio are significant and positive, indicating that banks with higher capital ratio adjust 
earnings faster. Size shows a significantly negative impact on the adjustment speed, 
suggesting that larger banks tend to have more persistent earnings than their smaller 
counterparts. A one standard deviation increase in Size decreases the adjustment speed by 
0.324% (0.054*0.06). Managerial Efficiency is also significantly and positively related to 
earnings adjustment speed.  
We conduct further analysis to examine whether the positive impact of bank 
competition on earnings adjustment speed is driven by those banks with earnings below 
their target (positive GAP), because these banks tend to have more incentives to adjust 
their earnings to their target levels than their better performed peer banks. We re-run the 
regressions on the subsample of banks with positive and negative GAP, respectively. The 
results are reported in Column (4) and (5) of Table 4. We find that the coefficients on 
Geographic Expansion index remain positive and significant in both specifications. It 
suggests that our main results are not driven by those banks with earnings below their 
target (positive GAP), and competition consistently erodes away the economic excessive 
returns (GAP<0) and expel losses (GAP>0) (Stigler, 1961).  
  
<Insert Table 4 here> 
 
4.2. Robustness analyses 
We also conduct additional tests to ensure that our results presented in Table 4 are 
not driven by potential biases in the sample or due to alternative explanations. Table 5 
reports the results.  
First, there exists a potential concern that our results may be driven by states that 
time their interstate bank branching deregulations to coincide with a higher level of bank 
earnings persistence. Thus, the positive coefficient estimates on Geographic Expansion 
Index in the previous regressions may simply reflect a trend of rising adjustment speed 
after the IBBEA deregulation. To address this concern, we further conduct the following 
empirical analysis. We follow Krishnan et al. (2014), and introduce the Before (4,1) 
dummy variable, which equals one for the years t-4 to t-1 preceding the deregulation year t. 
This variable captures the difference in earnings adjustment speed of banks in each state 
between the four-year period t-4 to t-1 prior to the deregulation year t and the years prior to 
the four-year period, t-5 and earlier, before the deregulation. If the deregulations are due to 
states trying to time earnings persistence or if our results above represent a secular trend in 
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earnings persistence, the coefficient estimate on Before (4,1) dummy should be positive 
and statistically significant. We do not find such evidence. In Column (1) of Table 5, the 
coefficient estimate of the Before (4,1) dummy is statistically insignificant. 
Second, if our results reflect a treatment effect of interstate bank branching 
deregulations by states, our results should disappear if we falsely assume that our treatment 
occurs one year prior to the actual deregulation year (Roberts and Whitted, 2011; Krishnan 
et al., 2014). For these tests, we repeat our main regressions of Equation (8) under such 
false definitions of Geographic Expansion Index, which takes the index value one year 
before the actual deregulation year. Column (2) of Table 5 reports that the coefficient 
estimate on the falsified Geographic Expansion Index is statistically insignificant. This 
result confirms that interstate bank branching law were not enacted under certain 
circumstances that coincide with other unobservable characteristics that also lifted bank 
earnings persistence. Furthermore, these results also indicate that reverse causality does not 
drive our results.  
Third, in order to examine the influence of deregulation over a long time horizon, we 
expand our sample for the main regression of Equation (8) to the time period of 1986 to 
2013. As shown in Column (3) of Table 5, the coefficient is significantly positive, which is 
the same as and consistent with those reported in Table 4. Fourth, we consider the potential 
bias by banks operating in multiple states. Thus, we restrict our sample to those banks with 
only one branch and banks with size below USD 100 million, respectively. The results 
reported in column (4) and (5) are consistent with our main findings. 
Fifth, we are concerned with the confounding effect of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
of 1999, which allows banks to diversify into various businesses. The literature suggests 
that the GLB Act of 1999 impacts on market competition (Chronopoulos, Liu, McMillan 
and Wilson, 2015) and hence may also affect bank earnings adjustment speed. However, it 
is empirically difficult to disentangle the effect of GLB Act from the impact of Riegle-Neal 
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 since the impact of both Acts 
may have overlapping time periods immediately after 1999.  In order to find a clean effect 
from IBBEA 1994, we repeat our main regression analysis using the sub-sample before 
year 1999 and find consistent results reported in Column (6). Sixth, we use standard errors 
that are clustered at the bank, state and state-year level. The coefficients of Geographic 
Expansion Index across column (7) to column (9) continue to be statistically significant at 
1% level.  
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Finally, as reported in Table 5B, we conduct a robustness test using event difference-
in-difference strategy following Bertrand and Mullianathan (2003), and Chemmanur, He 
and Nandy (2010) to further test whether our main results are sensitive to different 
methods. This method captures the dynamic variation of the difference between the 
treatment and control groups around a particular event. It could also prevent us from 
producing underestimated small standard errors by including a too long sample period in a 
difference-in-difference estimation (Bertrand et al. 2004)). We treat the introduction year 
of IBBEA for each state as our event year. We use the following model to test the dynamic 
impact from IBBEA on earnings adjustment speed: 
ROAit - ROAit-1=(∑Beforet+∑Aftert+γZit-1) GAPit-1+ 𝜀𝜀it,       (9) 
where GAPit-1 = ROA*it-1 - ROAit-1, Beforet (Aftert) is a dummy variable equal to 1 for t 
years before (after) the introduction of deregulation of a state. For example, Before5 equals 
1 for year 5 before a particular state’s deregulation introduction year, and 0 otherwise. We 
find that the coefficients on After1, After2, After3, After4 are all positive and statistically 
significant. This result shows that after the introduction of deregulation, banks accelerate 
earnings adjustment speed. This effect is most pronounced 2 and 3 years after the 
introduction year. These results are consistent with our main results.  
 
<Insert Table 5A here> 
<Insert Table 5B here> 
 
4.3. The effect of banks’ heterogeneous ability to sustain earnings on earnings 
persistence 
In the previous sections we have established causality between competition and 
bank earnings adjustment speed. In this subsection, we attempt to strengthen the 
interpretation of this relation by exploring the impact of banks’ heterogenous abilities in 
sustaining earnings, which affects their earnings adjustment speed. The hypothesis is that 
the impact of competition on bank earnings adjustment speed should be less strong for 
banks with higher level of ability to sustain their previous years’ earnings.  
Specifically, we expect that banks with larger size, higher level of diversification, 
more efficient in management and lower level of default risk have stronger ability to 
sustain earnings. A large bank size usually indicates comprehensive strength, which may 
help banks increase their earnings persistence. Product diversification reflects banks’ 
business expansion, which increases banks’ attractiveness to customers (De Young and 
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Rice (2004) and Stiroh and Rumble (2006)). Further, income diversification effectively 
reduces earnings volatility caused by a particular external event. Banks’ safety and 
soundness could reduce banks’ default risk induced by external shocks. Efficient bank  
management not only reduces operation costs but also makes timely and effective 
strategies to mitigate loss caused by external changes or is even able to find opportunities 
in external crises (Lin and Zhang, 2010; Shehzad et al., 2010). 
In the empirical analysis, we introduce four variables, size, diversification, 
managerial efficiency, and Z-score, and their interaction terms with the Geographic 
Expansion Index. Table 6 presents the regression results. The relations between the 
interaction terms of size, diversification, managerial efficiency and Z-score and earnings 
adjustment speed, respectively, are negative and significant. These results indicate that 
banks with larger size, higher level of diversification, higher managerial efficiency and 
lower level of default risk could persist earnings longer and hence, the impact of 
competition of earnings adjustment speed is less stronger. 
 
<Insert Table 6 here> 
 
5. The impact of competition on earnings management 
In the previous sections we document a positive impact of bank competition and a 
negative impact of bank earnings management on bank earnings adjustment speed. Our 
findings emphasize that the impact of bank competition on earnings adjustment speed is 
direct and causal. However, the accounting literature emphasizes the role of earnings 
management in shaping the relation between competition and earnings persistence (Li, 
2010; Healy et al., 2014).  
This argument implicitly suggests that competition may indirectly impact earnings 
persistence through the channel of earnings management because an increased competition 
could lead to lower level of earnings management. The reasoning is that competition 
increases the cost of misreporting, thereby curbing the incentives of earnings management. 
With more competitive rivals, firms are more likely to lose their shareholders, customers 
and suppliers due to the damage of reputation caused by misreporting (Graham et al., 
2005). Consequently, it is possible that competition reduces earnings management and that 
such a reduced earnings management results in a lower level of earnings persistence, or 
equivalently speaking, a higher speed of earnings adjustment, as we found in. We 
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investigate whether this indirect channel may exist and drive our main results by using two 
earnings management models in this section.  
 
5.1. The impact of competition on Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions (DLLP) 
          In this subsection we examine the direct impact of bank competition on bank 
earnings management, as measured by discretionary loan loss provisions. If it is indeed 
that bank competition impact on earnings persistence indirectly through the earnings 
management channel, we would expect a negative relationship between the Geographic 
Expansion Index and our bank earnings management measure, otherwise the impact of 
competition on earnings adjustment speed would not be positive.  
Table 7 presents the results. The coefficient of Geographic Expansion Index is 
significantly positive, indicating the positive impact of bank competition on earnings 
management. In Column (1), a one inter-quartile increase in the Geographic Expansion 
Index leads to an increase of 0.018% in Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions. These results 
support the recent growing studies that find that bank competition encourages bank 
earnings management. For instance, Tomy et al. (2016) argue that banks would inflate loss 
provisions, which reduces reported earnings and hence discourages the entry of new banks. 
Dou, Ryan, and Zou (2016) argue that banks would suppress loan provisions, which 
creates the impression of high underwriting quality and hence helps deter the entry of new 
banks. Our evidence does not support the notion that competition reduces earnings 
management (see, e.g., Graham et al., 2005; Lin et al., 2016; Burks et al., 2016; Jiang et 
al., 2016).  
We further examine whether the impact of bank competition on earnings 
management is driven by banks with earnings above their targets (GAP<0), because these 
outperforming banks have more incentives to manipulate earnings to avoid sudden drops in 
earnings. We thus re-run the regressions with two sub-samples of banks with earnings 
below (GAP>0) and above (GAP<0) their target, respectively. Column (2) and (3) of Table 
7 report the results. We find that the coefficient of Geographic Expansion Index is 
significantly positive only in the GAP<0 regression but not in the GAP>0 regression. 
These results indicate that the impact of bank competition on earnings management is 
driven by banks that have higher ROA than their targets (GAP<0). 
 <Insert Table 7 here> 
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5.2. The impact of competition on bank earnings management through Available 
for Sale Securities (AFS securities) 
Prior research documents that banks tend to use the item of available for sale (AFS) 
securities to smooth earnings (Barth et al., 2017; Dong and Zhang, 2015). AFS securities is 
the largest category of banks’ securities and contains a sizable proportion of bank assets 
(Nissim and Penman, 2007; Laux and Leuz, 2010). Standards Codification (ASC) Topic 
320 specifies that AFS securities should be measured as fair value in the statement of 
financial position, with changes in fair value recognized in other comprehensive income. 
Hence, the accounting treatment for gains and losses from AFS securities provides banks a 
chance to engage in earnings management by selling these securities and realizing selected 
gains and losses. After the announcement of Accounting Standard Codification (ASC) 320, 
it is increasingly popular that banks use AFS securities to manage earnings due to large 
size of this item and lower cost of managing this item (Nissim and Penman, 2007; Laux 
and Leuz, 2010).  
In this Section, we examine whether competition induces earnings smoothing via 
utilizing the AFS securities. Following Barth et al. (2017) and Dong and Zhang (2015), we 
use realized gains and losses of AFS securities model to capture bank earnings 
management. We estimate the following model: 
  AFS securitiesit = 𝛽𝛽1Net Incomeit + 𝛽𝛽2 Competitionit  
                             + 𝛽𝛽3 Net Incomeit х Competitionit   
                                           + 𝛽𝛽4Discretionary Loan Loss Provisionsit +𝛽𝛽5Z-scoreit  
                             + 𝛽𝛽6Capital Ratioit +𝛽𝛽7 Loan to Total Assetit + 𝛽𝛽8Sizeit  
                             + 𝛽𝛽9Total Assets Growth Rateit + 𝛽𝛽10Managerial Efficiencyit  
                             + 𝛽𝛽11Income Diversificationit + 𝛽𝛽12GDP Growth Rateit  
                             + 𝛽𝛽13Inflationit + 𝛽𝛽14GDP Per Capitait + ε𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖               (10) 
where AFS securitiesit is realized gains and losses on AFS securities and Net Incomeit is net 
income before taxes and gains and losses on AFS securities, both deflated by beginning-of-
year total assets. Competitionit is the Geographic Expansion Index. If banks employ AFS 
securities to maintain persistent earnings, the coefficient on Net Incomeit,  𝛽𝛽1, should be 
negative, and if banks under more competition realize more gains from AFS securities, the 
coefficient on Competitionit, 𝛽𝛽2, should be positive. Our interested coefficient is 𝛽𝛽3, the 
interaction term between Net Incomeit and Competitionit.. It tests whether earnings 
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smoothing is more pronounced for banks under higher competition. A negative 𝛽𝛽3 implies 
that competition would directly intensify banks earnings smoothing behavior. 1F2 
The results are reported in Table 8. In column (1), net income before tax is 
negatively related to realized gains and losses of AFS securities. This finding suggests that 
banks use AFS securities to smooth earnings, which is consistent with Barth et al. (2017). 
The interaction term of Geographic Expansion Index and Net Income is insignificant, 
indicating that bank competition does not induce more earnings smoothing by utilizing 
AFS securities. Column (2) and (3) consistently show insignificant coefficients on the 
interaction term of Geographic Expansion Index and Net Income when we consider the 
sub-samples when GAP >0 and GAP<0, respectively. These results further confirm our 
main findings that bank competition has a direct rather than indirect impact on bank 
earnings persistence through the channel of earnings management.  
 
<Insert Table 8 here> 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this study we investigate whether competition directly affects bank earnings 
persistence or indirectly go through the channel of earnings management. We employ a 
sample of commercial banks in the U.S. from 1986 to 2013. We use the introduction of the 
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) as a natural experiment of 
competition, which could effectively mitigate endogeneity issues in prior research. By 
applying a two-stage partial adjustment model, we find a negative impact of competition 
on earnings persistence, consistent with economic competition theory that competition 
directly impacts earnings persistence. O the other hand, we do not find a negative relation 
between competition and earnings management, although we find a positive relation 
between earnings management and persistence. Therefore, our evidence rules out the 
possibility that competition could indirectly decrease earnings persistence through the 
channel of earnings management. 
Our findings are useful for scholars and practitioners, who seek to understand bank 
earnings persistence. The implication for policy makers is to pay attention to form a 
healthy competition environment for existing banks while at the same time encourage 
 
2 It is worth to note that the model of Barth et al., (2017) only allows us to check whether banks use 
AFS securities to smooth earnings, but not the magnitude of this earnings management. 
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information disclosure quality. As a result, investors could obtain more valuable 
information regarding banks performance and the banking industry could become more 
stable, contributing to the stability of the financial system.  
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Table 1 
Panel A Summary Statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics for banks during the period of five years before and five years after the 
year when the IBBEA act was introduced in each state. ROA* is estimated using the first stage of the partial 
adjustment model, ROAit =λi𝛽𝛽iXit-1 + (1- λi) ROAit-1+ 𝜀𝜀it, GAPit=ROA*it-1-ROAit-1.  ΔROA= ROAit-ROAit-1. We 
use Fama-Macbeth regression to estimate the ROA* in the first stage. Appendix presents the definitions of 
variables. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variable Name Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Target ROA(ROA*) 77929 1.048 0.530 -2.834 2.424 
ROA 77929 0.974 0.723 -4.440 2.961 
GAP 77929 0.091 0.766 -2.908 4.520 
ΔROA 77929 0.030 0.682 -7.401 7.401 
Discretionary Loan Loss 
Provisions 77929 0.435 0.270 0.011 1.319 
Realized gains and losses 
of AFS 77929 0.004 0.052 -6.433 8.044 
Geographic Expansion 
Index 77929 2.060 1.907 0.000 4.000 
Z-score 77929 24.132 17.069 0.428 83.816 
Capital Ratio 77929 9.799 3.460 3.992 36.872 
Loan to Total Asset 77929 63.118 20.751 13.274 148.805 
Total Assets (million) 77929 705.256 15091.220 0.723 1746242.000 
Size (Log total Asset) 77929 11.339 1.296 8.679 15.734 
Total Assets Growth  77929 8.686 15.879 -18.691 125.575 
Managerial Efficiency 77929 20.808 8.741 -4.076 45.923 
Income Diversification 77929 10.131 7.519 0.492 53.253 
Inflation 27 2.463 0.763 0.879 3.793 
GDP Growth 27 2.746 1.585 -3.109 4.869 
GDP Per Capita 27 10.307 0.304 9.822 10.819 
Panel B Summary statistics around IBBEA introduction  
This table presents summary of interested variables before and after the introduction of IBBEA in each state for a 10 year 
window.*, **, *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
  Before Deregulation After Deregulation   
Difference in 
Mean 
  Mean  Median 
Standard 
Deviation Mean  Median 
Standard 
Deviation  After-Before 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
Discretionary Loan Loss 
Provisions 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.002  0.001*** 
Z-score 24.403 20.883 16.868 25.167 21.120 17.292  0.764*** 
Capital Ratio 9.340 8.629 3.118 10.242 9.355 3.591  0.009*** 
Loan to Total Asset 58.978 59.180 19.226 66.213 66.083 19.950  0.072** 
Total Assets (million) 361.950 57.986 3278.168 875.287 102.418 8306.641  513.337*** 
Total Assets Growth Rate 7.806 5.004 15.205 10.424 6.812 16.924  2.61762*** 
Managerial Efficiency 22.148 22.195 7.687 19.387 19.216 7.601  -2.761*** 
Income Diversification 9.198 7.667 6.498 10.082 8.404 7.313    0.884*** 
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Table 2 
Correlation Matrix 
This table reports the correlation covariance. * denotes the 5% significance level. Appendix presents the definitions of variables.  
  
Geographic 
Expansion 
Index 
Discretiona
ry Loan 
Loss 
Provisions 
Z-score Capital ratio 
Loan to 
total asset Size 
Total 
Assets 
Growth  
Managerial 
efficiency 
Income 
diversificati
on 
Inflation GDP growth  
GDP per 
capita 
Geographic 
Expansion 
Index 
1            
Discretionary 
Loan Loss 
Provisions 
0.0728* 1           
Z-score 0.0267* -0.2257* 1          
Capital ratio 0.1970* -0.2168* 0.3399* 1         
Loan to total 
asset 0.2542* 0.4709* -0.2191* -0.1983* 1 
       
Size 0.3104* 0.1196* -0.0026 -0.1127* 0.3062* 1       
Total Assets 
Growth  0.0390* 0.1413* -0.1349* -0.0899* 0.5593* 0.1602* 1 
     
Managerial 
efficiency -0.2891* -0.1342* 0.1934* 0.2947* 0.1186* 0.2862* 0.0205* 1 
    
Income 
diversification 0.1889* 0.0039 -0.1554* 0.0560* 0.0389* 0.2982* 0.0499* -0.1032* 1   
 
Inflation -0.4282* -0.0004 -0.0239* -0.1188* -0.0893* -0.1314* -0.0162* 0.2305* -0.1297* 1   
GDP growth  -0.1653* -0.2515* 0.0101* -0.0389* -0.0445* -0.1141* 0.0231* -0.0117* -0.0621* -0.0031 1  
GDP per capita 0.3786* -0.2058* 0.0115* 0.2171* 0.2440* 0.3250* 0.0155* -0.3318* 0.2311* -0.3904* -0.3128* 1 
31 
 
Table 3 
First Stage Partial Adjustment Model 
This table reports the results of the first-stage partial adjustment model assuming a static earnings 
adjustment speed. ROAit =λi𝛽𝛽iXit-1 + (1- λi) ROAit-1+ 𝜀𝜀it, where (1- λi) is the level of persistence of 
ROA. In column (1), we follow Fama and French (2006) and Healy et al. (2014) to use Fama-Macbeth 
regression for estimating ROA. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance levels, respectively. In this regression, we use the original values of these ratios instead of 
percentages. Appendix presents the definitions of variables. 
Dependent Variable ROAt 
ROAt-1 0.512*** 
 (22.06) 
Revenuet-1 0.005*   
 (1.74) 
Capital ratiot-1 0.066 
 (0.37) 
Loanst-1 -0.027*** 
 (-4.54)    
Total Assetst-1 -0.004**  
 (-2.21)    
Diversificationt-1 0.004*** 
 (3.42) 
Managerial Efficiencyt-1 0.129*** 
 (13.97)    
Growth of Total Assetst-1  0.002*** 
 (6.11) 
Constant -0.456** 
 (-2.02) 
  
N 77929 
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Table 4 
Determinants of Bank Profit Adjustment Speed: a ten-year window of IBBEA     
We assume λi to be dynamic, so it varies across banks and over time. Z is a vector of all independent 
variables. This table presents the OLS results for parameter estimates on Z in the Partial Adjustment 
Model: (ROAit - ROAit-1 = ( λi + γZit-1 ) GAPit-1 + 𝜀𝜀it ,GAPit-1 = ROA*it-1 - ROAit-1) over the ten-year 
period in which no more than five years are distant from the IBBEA introduction year. Discretionary 
Loan Loss Provisions are the proxy for earnings management across all columns. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. *, **, *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Appendix 
presents the definitions of variables. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
    
Below 
target 
Above 
target 
    GAP>0 GAP<0 
Geographic Expansion Index 0.094***  0.090*** 0.057*** 0.042*** 
 (7.38)  (8.70) (11.09) (7.11)    
Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions  -0.178*** -0.176*** 0.041*** -0.069*** 
  (-4.25) (-4.22) (9.66) (-10.21) 
Z-score -0.012 -0.009 -0.009 -0.004 -0.116*** 
 (-1.63) (-1.21) (-1.21) (-0.68) (-12.46)    
Capital Ratio 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.022*** -0.005 0.007 
 (3.14) (3.21) (3.21) (-1.13) (1.27) 
Loan to Total Asset -0.004 -0.010 -0.010 0.062*** -0.003 
 (-0.60) (-0.96) (-0.96) (9.13) (-0.39)    
Size -0.053*** -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.051*** -0.074*** 
 (-5.03) (-5.04) (-5.04) (-5.34) (-9.65)    
Total Assets Growth  0.006 0.008 0.008 -0.023*** 0.021*** 
 (1.28) (1.43) (1.43) (-5.52) (3.84) 
Managerial Efficiency -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.004 -0.072*** 
 (-4.11) (-4.22) (-4.22) (-1.09) (-11.99) 
Income Diversification -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 0.018*** -0.039*** 
 (-1.03) (-1.11) (-1.11) (5.45) (-6.43)    
Inflation 0.017 0.019 0.019 -0.049*** -0.068*** 
 (1.12) (1.34) (1.34) (-8.49) (-11.91)    
GDP Growth  0.013 0.014 0.014 -0.119*** 0.019*** 
 (1.39) (1.50) (1.50) (-21.74) (3.38) 
GDP Per Capita -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.383*** -0.197*** 
 (-0.06) (-0.09) (-0.09) (-25.28) (-14.22)    
Constant 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.097*** 0.850*** 0.738*** 
 (9.66) (9.70) (9.70) (54.33) (51.39) 
      
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 77929 77929 77929 128584 97513 
adj. R-sq 0.792 0.793 0.793 0.659 0.613 
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Table 5A 
Determinants of Bank Profit Adjustment Speed:  Robustness Analysis 
We assume λi to be dynamic, so it varies across banks and over time. Z is a vector of all independent variables. This table presents the placebo tests of the OLS results for parameter estimates on 
Z in the Partial Adjustment Model: (ROAit - ROAit-1 = ( λi +γZit-1)GAPit-1 + 𝜀𝜀it, GAPit-1 = ROA*it-1 - ROAit-1). Column (1) shows the results controlling for the four years prior to the deregulation 
year. Before (4, 1) is a dummy variable equals one for year -4 to -1 relative to the deregulation year. Columns (2) displays the results under which Geographic Expansion Index variable is the 
actual index for one year prior to the actual deregulation. Column (3) displays the regression results for both large banks and their smaller counterparts. Column (4) presents the regression 
results using the full sample. Column (5) to (7) present the regression results using the sub samples, while (8) to (10) show regression results using different standard errors clustering method. t-
statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Appendix presents the definitions of variables. 
 Before(4,1) dummy 
Falsified one-
year before 
Geographic 
Expansion  
Index 
Full sample 
Banks with  
only one 
branch 
Banks with 
total  
assets smaller 
than  
100million 
Before  
GLB Act 
Bank-level 
clustering 
State-level 
clustering 
State-year- 
level 
clustering 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Geographic Expansion  
Index 
0.088*** -0.007 0.071*** 0.016*** 0.082*** 0.029*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 
 (18.85) (-1.36) (18.33) (3.55) (6.35) (6.16) (12.01) (3.80) (4.74) 
Before (4,1) 0.011         
 (0.05)         
Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.025*** -0.021*** -0.082*** -0.021** -0.126** -0.126* -0.126*** 
 (-3.27) (-2.58) (-5.87) (-3.14) (-5.51) (-2.19) (-2.32) (-1.89) (-2.63) 
Early Deregulation Index  0.019** 0.017**       
  (2.31) (2.21)       
Z-score -0.013*** -0.032*** -0.058*** -0.090*** -0.050*** -0.061*** -0.069*** -0.069*** -0.069*** 
 (-12.11) (-5.68) (-12.25) (-9.12) (-7.36) (-6.49) (-7.79) (-8.46) (-10.72) 
Leverage Ratio 0.017*** 0.017*** -0.201*** -0.001 0.004 0.019*** 0.014** 0.014** 0.014** 
 (3.64) (3.79) (-3.27) (-0.17) (0.76) (4.42) (2.26) (2.41) (2.49) 
Loan to Total Asset 0.058*** 0.000 0.049*** 0.033** 0.001 -0.007 -0.026*** -0.026** -0.026*** 
 (13.33) (0.02) (11.66) (2.62) (0.13) (-0.83) (-2.86) (-2.44) (-2.86) 
Size -0.049*** -0.076*** -0.062*** -0.092*** -0.077*** -0.106*** -0.124*** -0.124*** -0.124*** 
 (-5.62) (-8.93) (-11.57) (-6.92) (-6.83) (-9.71) (-11.90) (-13.42) (-19.08) 
Total Assets Growth  0.004 0.004 -0.011*** -0.002 0.017*** -0.002 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 (0.85) (1.14) (-3.25) (-0.26) (3.37) (-0.38) (2.82) (3.43) (3.01) 
Managerial Efficiency -0.023*** -0.038*** -0.025*** -0.043*** -0.042*** -0.043*** -0.093*** -0.093*** -0.093*** 
 (-4.34) (-9.60) (-7.61) (-3.97) (-9.56) (-4.93) (-14.06) (-13.61) (-16.58) 
Income Diversification -0.010** -0.007* 0.000 -0.012* -0.013** -0.034*** -0.013** -0.013 -0.013*** 
 (-2.28) (-1.90) (0.03) (-2.00) (-2.01) (-4.77) (-2.10) (-1.64) (-2.60) 
GDP Growth  0.015 0.001 -0.075*** -0.054*** -0.114*** -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
 (1.62) (0.29) (-25.29) (-5.86) (-15.15) (-0.76) (-0.93) (-0.95) (-0.88) 
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Inflation 0.006 -0.019*** -0.056*** -0.029*** 0.048*** 0.009 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.47) (-3.51) (-16.63) (-3.33) (2.97) (1.21) (0.11) (0.14) (0.08) 
GDP Per Capita -0.321*** -0.121*** -0.354*** -0.192*** -0.592*** 0.114*** 0.047 0.047 0.047 
 (-45.30) (-37.27) (-43.49) (-8.84) (-19.46) (5.75) (1.09) (1.24) (0.94) 
Constant 0.896*** 0.857*** 0.823*** 0.659*** 1.124*** 0.750*** 0.702*** 0.702*** 0.702*** 
 (80.29) (85.79) (88.14) (26.71) (24.80) (43.23) (19.55) (21.07) (16.69) 
          
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 226153 77929 226153 42942 102551 140572 77929 77929 77929 
adj. R-sq 0.826 0.808 0.701 0.777 0.614 0.826 0.697 0.697 0.697 
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Table 5B 
Determinants of Bank Profit Adjustment Speed:  Robustness checks 
 We assume λi to be dynamic, so it varies across banks and over time. Z is a vector of all independent 
variables. This table presents the OLS results for parameter estimates on Z in the Partial Adjustment 
Model. We use the event DID results. [ROAit - ROAit-1=(∑Beforet+∑Aftert+ γZit-1) GAPit-1+ 𝜀𝜀it, GAPit-
1 = ROA*it-1 - ROAit-1], Beforet(Aftert) is a dummy variable equal to 1 for t years before(after) the 
introduction of deregulation of a state. For example, Before5 equals 1 for year 5 before a state’s first 
time deregulation, and 0 otherwise. We apply OLS regression. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** 
denote the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Appendix presents the definitions of 
variables.  
  (1) 
Before 5 -0.037** 
 (-2.57) 
Before 4 -0.031* 
 (-1.82) 
Before 3 0.006 
 (0.37) 
Before 2 -0.020 
 (-1.21) 
Before 1 0.011 
 (0.90) 
After 1 0.034*** 
 (2.59) 
After 2 0.258*** 
 (4.02) 
After 3 0.1190* 
 (1.78) 
After 4 0.032** 
 (2.56) 
After 5 0.008 
 (0.61) 
Discretionary Loan Loss provisions -0.113* 
 (-1.89) 
Constant 0.7585*** 
 (112.92) 
Bank Controls Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes 
N 77929 
adj. R-sq 0.687 
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Table 6 
Determinants of Bank Profit Adjustment Speed: Heterogeneity 
This table investigates the potential mechanisms between earnings adjustment speed and bank 
competition. The Geographic Expansion measure is a state level competition measure. Following Rice 
and Strahan (2010), Geographic Expansion is an index that captures the level of interstate Geographic 
Expansion for each state. All other variables are defined in the appendix. *, **, *** represents the 
significance level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Geographic Expansion  
Index *Size -0.034***    
 (-6.28)    
Geographic Expansion  
Index *Income Diversification  -0.011***   
  (-2.93)   
Geographic Expansion  
Index *Managerial Efficiency   -0.037***  
   (-5.83)  
Geographic Expansion  
Index *Z-score    -0.007*** 
    (-3.45)    
Geographic Expansion  
Index 0.056*** 0.042*** 0.057*** 0.088*** 
 (4.27) (6.68) (5.96) (7.43)    
Discretionary Loan Loss provisions -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.016*** -0.021*** 
 (-4.75) (-5.17) (-3.84) (-5.13)    
Z-score -0.086*** -0.084*** -0.090*** -0.114*** 
 (-17.28) (-16.69) (-18.56) (-11.45)    
Capital Ratio -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003    
 (-0.42) (-0.38) (-0.56) (-0.43)    
Loan to Total Asset 0.072*** 0.071*** 0.056*** 0.070*** 
 (13.62) (13.12) (10.11) (13.31)    
Size -0.033*** -0.065*** -0.070*** -0.064*** 
 (-4.02) (-12.13) (-12.95) (-12.09)    
Total Assets Growth Rate -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.010*** -0.017*** 
 (-4.75) (-4.39) (-2.63) (-4.37)    
Managerial Efficiency -0.107*** -0.042*** -0.012*** -0.036*** 
 (-5.14) (-8.38) (-2.89) (-7.52)    
Income Diversification 0.005* -0.018*** 0.004 -0.000    
 (1.80) (-2.84) (1.26) (-0.06)    
GDP Growth Rate -0.077*** -0.077*** -0.077*** -0.078*** 
 (-23.47) (-23.67) (-23.87) (-23.88)    
Inflation -0.071*** -0.073*** -0.070*** -0.074*** 
 (-21.85) (-22.31) (-22.03) (-22.60)    
GDP Per Capita -0.261*** -0.254*** -0.249*** -0.256*** 
 (-41.61) (-41.39) (-40.17) (-41.87)    
Constant 0.980*** 0.634*** 0.691*** 0.618*** 
 (18.76) (70.01) (103.31) (48.61)    
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 226153 226153 226153 226153 
adj. R-sq 0.707 0.707 0.708 0.7073  
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Table 7 
The Impact of Competition on Bank Earnings Management 
This table presents the OLS results between competition and earnings management with the full 
sample, and when the bank is above or below its ROA target (GAP<0 or GAP>0). The dependent 
variable, earnings management, is measured by Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions. As to 
independent variable, competition is measured by Geographic Expansion Index. *, **, *** denote 
the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Appendix presents the definitions of 
variables. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    Below target Above target 
  Full Sample GAP>0 GAP<0 
Geographic Expansion Index 0.00008**  0.00000 0.00002**  
 (1.97)    (0.77) (2.32)    
Z-score -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** 
 (-10.20)    (-1.52) (-14.93) 
Leverage Ratio -0.001 0.002** -0.003*** 
 (-1.14)    (1.98) (-3.29) 
Loan to Total Asset 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 
 (131.77) (108.44) (94.53) 
Size 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (8.56) (3.41) (7.71) 
Total Assets Growth Rate -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-70.73)    (-49.13) (-53.47) 
Managerial Efficiency -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** 
 (-13.86) (-0.89) (-3.81) 
Income Diversification 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (4.99) (6.23) (4.07) 
GDP Growth Rate -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-89.79)    (-49.22) (-49.38) 
Inflation -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (-185.22)    (-177.35) (-95.00) 
GDP Per Capita 0.043*** 0.037*** 0.044*** 
 (52.89) (30.66) (34.03) 
Constant -0.456*** -0.388*** -0.457*** 
 (-52.25)    (-29.25) (-31.92) 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes     
N 214403 128584 97513 
adj. R-sq 0.776 0.778 0.771 
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Table 8 
The Impact of Competition on Bank Realized gains/losses of AFS 
This table investigates whether competition induces banks earnings management using realized 
gains/losses of available for sale securities, when the bank is above or below its ROA target (GAP<0 or 
GAP>0). The dependent variable is Realized gains/losses of AFS scaled by total assets. NI is net income 
before tax and realized gains/losses of AFS scaled by total assets. The Geographic Expansion Index 
measure is a state level competition measure. All other variables are defined in the appendix. *, **, *** 
represents the significance level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Appendix presents the definitions of 
variables. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    Below target Above target 
  Full Sample GAP>0 GAP<0 
NI -0.048*** -0.012*** -0.008*** 
 (-26.62) (-24.04) (-18.07) 
Geographic Expansion Index 0.000 0.000001* 0.000 
 (0.16) (1.69) (1.04) 
NI*Geographic Expansion Index -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-0.83) (0.53) (1.46) 
Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions 0.035*** 0.001 0.009*** 
 (10.01) (1.19) (6.36) 
Z-score -0.000*** -0.000* 0.000 
 (-2.91) (-1.87) (1.39) 
Leverage Ratio 0.000 -0.000 0.000*** 
 (0.22) (-0.47) (3.20) 
Loan to Total Asset -0.002*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-6.34) (-7.51) (-8.48) 
Size 0.005*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (2.73) (9.52) (6.42) 
Total Assets Growth Rate 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 
 (3.43) (4.59) (1.43) 
Managerial Efficiency -0.003*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-23.05) (-22.31) (-14.51) 
Income Diversification -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-7.84) (-5.38) (-3.89) 
GDP Growth Rate 0.003*** 0.000 0.000*** 
 (8.72) (1.19) (3.91) 
Inflation -0.008*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-8.00) (-6.73) (-3.55) 
GDP Per Capita -0.003*** 0.000*** 0.000** 
 (-6.67) (5.48) (1.98) 
Constant 0.001 -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (1.51) (-9.50) (-5.42) 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 146338 78491 47324 
adj. R-sq 0.112 0.079 0.081 
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Appendix 
Definition of Variables 
Variable Name Definition 
Earnings Management 
measure 
 
Discretionary Loan Loss 
Provisions 
The Earnings Management measures the discretionary loan loss provisions 
manipulated by each bank. It is obtained from the discretionary loan loss 
provision model (Cohen et al., 2014). We treat the absolute value of the error 
term as the earnings management indicator. The Higher the absolute residual 
value, the more earnings management the bank applied. 
Competition Measures  
Geographic Expansion 
Index 
The Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) is an 
exogenous shock of competition. Followed by Rice and Strahan (2010), 
Geographic Expansion Index captures the level of interstate branching 
restrictions for each state. Before 1994, the index in each state equals to 
zero, while, after 1994, this index ranges from zero to four. The index equals 
to four for states that are most open to out-of-state entry. Then, we minus 
one to the index when a state has any of the four barriers: requiring a 
minimum age of 3 or more years on the acquiring banks; not allowing de 
novo interstate branching; not permitting the acquisition of single branch or 
portions of an institution; mandating a deposit cap on branch acquisitions 
less than 30%. Thus, 4 means highest competition and 0 means lowest 
competition  
Bank-controls  
Z-score 
The Z-score is an accounting-based bank-level indicator of financial 
stability. It is measured by the sum of return of total assets and capital ratio 
over the standard deviation of return of total assets. We use 3-year rolling 
window to estimate standard deviation of ROA. Higher Z-score indicates 
greater financial stability.  
Capital Ratio The ratio of total equity to total assets 
Bank Size The natural logarithm of total assets 
Total Assets Growth  The yearly total assets growth rate 
Managerial Efficiency One minus the ratio of total cost to total income 
Income Diversification The ratio of non-interest income to total operating income 
Loans to total assets.  The ratio of total loans to total assets 
Early Deregulation Index 
Early Deregulation Index represents the wave of deregulation before 
IBBEA.  This index equals zero prior to the earlier of the year of intra- or 
inter-state deregulations, one if the state deregulates either full intra-state 
branching through acquisition and de novo branching or inter-state banking, 
and two if the state deregulates both types of branching expansions. The 
years of these deregulations are gained from Kroszner and Strahan (1999). 
Macro-controls  
GDP Growth  Annual GDP growth rate 
Inflation Annual inflation rate 
GDP per capita GDP divided by the number of the people in the country 
